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Abstract
The advocates of modern western democracy promote the viewpoint that the class division of
the society is becoming outdated. We attempt to disprove this statement with an example of
28 German parties who participated in the 2013 federal election. The official party positions on
38 policy issues are considered and the parties are identified with vectors of this 38-dimensional
policy space. The statement in question, that there is no predominant political axis, would imply
that the party vectors are scattered homogeneously, making a ball-shaped cloud of ‘observations’.
However, the Prime Component Analysis (PCA) shows that the party vectors constitute a thin
ellipsoid whose two longest diameters cover 83.4% of the total variance. The consequent party
ordering is the left-right axis rolled in a circumference, making the far-left and far-right ends
meet. Basing on this empirical evidence, we conclude that neither the left–right characterization
of parties nor the class opposition is outdated.
Next, it is shown that the electoral success is highly correlated with the number of party
members, but not with the party’s capacity to represent public opinion. For this purpose, a
representativeness index is defined which measures how well the party policy profiles match
with the results of 36 public opinion polls on 36 out of the 38 policy issues mentioned. To
reveal representativeness trends, the parties are ordered contiguously, with neighboring parties
having close policy profiles. This contiguous ordering is found with four optimization methods:
(1) dimensionality reduction by means of PCA, (2) traveling salesman problem to construct
the shortest chain of proximate parties, (3) least squares to minimize the distances between
parties with close profiles, and (4) largest squares to maximize the distances between parties
with opposite profiles. The most salient trend is observed for the circular left–right party
ordering found with the PCA. The best representatives of public opinion are the moderate
left, next come the far-left and the far-right, and the least representative are moderate right
(conservative) parties.
All of these imply the following warning. Since the collapse of communism damaged signif-
icantly the image of the left, their election today looks hardly probable, but the power can be
taken by the next-representative far-right parties who already represent public opinion better
than the currently governing conservative party.
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1 Introduction
Following [Marx 1867, Weber 1921], economists and sociologists consider classes as social groups
with common interests determined by income, property, education, social status, and relation to
the means of production. Their competing interests result in the class struggle headed by ‘left’
and ‘right’ political parties that emerged after the industrial revolution. The left (labourists,
social-democrats and communists) stand for egalitarianism, solidarity with income redistribu-
tion, and governmental intervention in the economy. The right (conservatives and economic
liberals) defend private property, free entrepreneurship, and equal opportunities. Until recently
the class struggle has been regarded as the major political drive, and, correspondingly, the left-
right axis has been predominantly used to locate political agents in the political space [Blattberg
2009, Bobbio and Cameron 1996, Gauchet 1996, Left-right politics 2015, Lipset 1960, Knapp
and Wright 2001, Mahoney, Coogle and Banks 1984, Political spectrum 2015, Rous and Lee
1978, Ruypers 2005, Ware 1996, Wilson 2004].
Discussing radical changes in the world order at the turn of the century, the advocates of
modern western democracy promote the viewpoint that the class division of the society is be-
coming outdated; see for instance [Giddens 1994, Manin 1997, Mitchell 2007, Sulakshin 2010,
Voda 2014]. It is argued that after the Soviet Union and Eastern Block ceased to exist, the class
struggle lost its inspiration by a systemic alternative. On the other hand, climate change, glob-
alization, competition of the West with inexorably rising China and India, aging population,
migration, ethnic tensions, religious intolerance, and international terrorism have swayed the
public attention away from left-right political confrontations toward less ideological and more
pragmatic matters. For instance, subordinating international class interests to national geopo-
litical challenges, [Streeck 1999] develops the idea of employer-employee ‘competitive solidarity’,
which to a certain extent supplants that of class struggle. Some authors emphasize that due to
increasing interdependence between countries, political platforms have come to be perceived as
a constraint for flexibly responding to the globalization trends. This results in the emergence
of less platform-determined, manager-type politicians who compete for votes by adjusting their
positions to numerous cleavages of the society and advertising themselves in the media before
large audiences:
In party democracy electoral cleavages reflect class division. In a number of Western
societies the situation today is different. No socioeconomic or cultural cleavage is
evidently more important and stable than others. To be sure, citizens do not consti-
tute a homogeneous mass that can be divided in any manner by the choices they are
offered, but the social and cultural lines of cleavage are numerous, crosscutting, and
rapidly changing. Such an electorate is capable of a number of splits. The number of
floating voters who do not cast their ballot on the basis of stable party identification
is increasing. A growing segment of the electorate tends to vote according to the
stakes and issues of each election.
[Manin 1997, pp. 209, 223, 231].
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From all of these, it is concluded that the political spectrum is becoming essentially multi-
dimensional, replacing the former left-right ideological alignment. This viewpoint is reflected in
numerous studies, particularly referring to the prize-winning MANIFESTO-database with up to
over 400-dimensional representation of party programs from more than 50 countries covering all
free democratic elections since 1945 [Budge et al 2001, Budge and McDonald 2007, Klingemann
et al 2006, Linhart and Shikano 2009, Volkens et al 2013, WZB 2015]. The internet voting
advice applications (VAAs) implemented in about 20 countries also assume multiple cleavages
and, correspondingly, multidimensional political spectra [EU profiler 2009, Garzia and Marschall
2014, Kieskompas 2006, Vote match Europe 2015].
We attempt to disprove the statement about multiplicity of equally important political di-
mensions with an example of German political space represented by 28 political parties who
participated in the 2013 Bundestag (federal) election. We consider the official party positions on
38 topical issues declared shortly before the election [Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung 2013]
and associate the parties with vectors of their policy profiles in the corresponding 38-dimensional
political space. The statement in question, that the left-right axis is no longer predominant,
would imply that the party vectors should be scattered more or less homogeneously, resulting in
a ball-shaped cloud of ‘observations’. However, the Prime Component Analysis (PCA) reveals
that the party vectors actually constitute a thin ellipsoid, whose two longest diameters explain
83.4% of the total variance. The consequent party ordering is the left-right alignment.
However, this result is not that straightforward. It turns out that the left-right axis is rolled
into a circumference, reflecting the fact that the far-left and far-right ends meet. This explains
why some empirical models fail to recognize a one-dimensional political spectrum [Sulakshin
2010, Voda 2014]: a circumference, being one-dimensional itself, cannot be placed in a one-
dimensional Euclidian space — to be accommodated it needs a Euclidian space with at least two
line axes. Thereby, our finding bridges two types of spatial political models [Gill and Hangartner
2010, Sect. 8]: directional models of successive policy shifts with circular representations and
angular measures [Grofman 1985, Linhart and Shikano 2009, Matthews 1979, Rabinowitz and
MacDonald 1989, Schofield 1985], and proximity models, which describe the distance between
political agents in the Euclidian space with line axes.
The form of German political spectrum found is further confirmed by a clear trend in the
party representativeness along the circular left-right axis. This logic of this implication is as
follows. If the left-right alignment were outdated, the party capacity to represent public opinion
would not depend on its left-right orientation but on some other factors regarded as more
important. The latter is disproved by showing that to a great extent the party representativeness
depends just on its left-right orientation. For this purpose, we define a representativeness index,
which measures how well the party positions match with the outcomes of public opinion polls
on the policy issues considered. Then we try to recognize statistically significant trends in this
index with respect to alternative party orderings. Salient trends are observed when the parties
are located along the left-right political axis, and the circular model exhibit even better results.
It turns out that the representativeness index exhibits no trend when the parties are ordered
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by votes received, as standard in electoral reports. The party’s number of votes highly correlates
with the number of party members but negatively correlates with the party’s representativeness,
though insignificantly. On the other hand, a clear trend emerges when the parties are contigu-
ously ordered with regard to the closeness of their political profiles. To find such an ordering,
four optimization methods are applied: (1) dimensionality reduction by means of PCA, (2) trav-
eling salesman problem to construct the shortest chain of proximate parties, (3) least squares to
minimize the distances between parties with close profiles, and (4) largest squares to maximize
the distances between parties with opposite profiles. The most convincing result with a clear
representativeness trend is observed for the circular left–right party ordering found with the
PCA. Generally, the highest representativeness is inherent in the left-hand end of the political
spectrum, and the lowest in the right-hand one. The circular model introduces a further refine-
ment: the best representatives of public opinion are the moderate left, next come the far-left
and the far-right, and the least representative are moderate right (conservative) parties.
Basing on this empirical evidence, we conclude that the left–right characterization of parties
which reflects the class opposition remains valid, being in no case outdated. Since the collapse
of communism damaged significantly the image of the left, their election today looks hardly
probable. At the same time, our study indicates at the raising far-right wing, whose represen-
tativeness already surpasses that of the conservative and centrist parties that has won the 2013
election. However, it looks that the superior representativeness of the moderate left can help to
restore their influence and presence in politics, decreasing that of the far-right.
In Section 2, ‘The model’, the data structure and the data derivatives for the model are
introduced. It is shown that the standard party ordering by votes received in election exhibits
no statistical significant trend in the party’s capacity to represent public opinion.
In Section 3, ‘Principal Component Analysis Solution’, a contiguous party ordering with a
salient trend in the party’s capacity to represent public opinion is obtained obtained by the
model dimensionality reduction.
In Section 4, ‘Traveling Salesman Problem Solution’, the task is reformulated in terms of
destinations and distances, and a contiguous party ordering desired is obtained by minimizing
the itinerary through all the destinations.
In Section 5, ‘Weighted least squares solution’, a contiguous party ordering is obtained by
minimizing the total weighted squared distance of the cells of the correlation triangle to its
diagonal weighted with the corresponding correlation coefficients with the opposite sign.
In Section 6, ‘Weighted largest squares solution’, a contiguous party ordering is obtained by
maximizing the total weighted squared distance of the cells of the correlation triangle from its
bottom-left edge weighted with the corresponding correlation coefficients with the opposite sign.
In Section 7, ‘Conclusions’, the results of the paper are recapitulated and put in the context.
9
2 The model
The outcomes of the 2013 German Bundestag (federal) election for the 28 participating parties
are shown in Table 1.1 As usual in electoral reports, the parties are ordered by decreasing num-
ber of votes received. However, this information is insufficient to analyze the German political
spectrum, and we also consider the data in Table 2 with 38 policy questions, estimates of their
importance (weights), and balances of public opinion and party positions on these questions. The
questions and the party positions are taken from the Wahl-O-Mat — voting advice application
of the German Federal Agency for Civic Education [Bundeszentrale fu¨r politische Bildung 2013].
Recall that the Wahl-O-Mat (an invented word composed from the German Wahl = election and
Automat) is the German version of the Dutch Internet site StemWijzer (‘VoteMatch’), which
was originally developed in the 1990s to involve young people in political participation [Pro
demos 2014]. Both web sites help users locate themselves on the political landscape by testing
how well their opinions match with party positions. Before an election (local, regional, federal,
and European), a special governmental supervising committee compiles a list of questions on
topical policy issues (’Introduce minimum wage?’-Yes/No, ’Introduce a general speed limit on
motorways?’- Yes/No, etc.) and asks the parties participating in the election for their answers.
A user of the site answers the same questions, eventually attributing weights to reflect their im-
portance, and then the program compares his or her political profile with that of the parties and
finds the best-matching party, the second best-matching party, etc. To exclude manipulations,
neither individual data, nor cumulative statistics are available from the Wahl-O-Mat. Even if
they were available, they could characterize only the position of internet users rather than of
the whole electorate: about 44 Mio Germans took part in the 2013 election, whereas the Wahl-
O-Mat had about 13 M visitors on this occasion, ca. 30% of the voters [Bundeswahlleiter 2013,
Bundeszentrale fu¨r politische Bildung 2014]. Therefore, the balances of public opinion in Table 2
are taken from relevant public opinion polls. The importance of the questions is estimated by
their weighting in four versions: equal (for ‘unweighted’ questions); log2 of thousand Google hits
for the question keywords (the logarithm with base 2 is a standard device to transform linear
measures into perception scales); and two expert scores, both ranging from 0 (unimportant) to
3 (very important) — by the director of the Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI),
Dsseldorf, Professor Brigitte Unger, and the Editor-in-Chief of the info-service Einblick, Berlin,
Anne Graef.
The bottom line of Table 2 contains the representativeness index of the parties. Firstly,
the popularity index — the percentage of the population represented by the party averaged on
all the questions — is computed in four versions for the four question weightings. Secondly,
the universality index — the percentage of the questions, for which the party represents a
majority of the population — is also computed in four versions for the four question weightings.
The party’s representativeness index is the mean of these four popularity and four universality
1All computations, as well as most tables and figures of the paper are made with the MATLAB (version 2014b)
programming environment optionally equipped with the MATLAB statistics and optimization toolboxes. The
exceptions are the official party logos in Table 1 and the torus in Figure 9 taken from Wikipedia.
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indices. The details of the index construction as well as the full information on the party
answers, their comments on them, and the description of the public opinion polls with all the
references are given in the report [Tangian 2013]; for the general methodology see [Tangian
2014]. As in Tables 1 and 2, the parties in Figure 1 are ordered by decreasing number of votes
in the 2013 election). Three curves show the party’s votes received, number of members, and
representativeness index. The correlation coefficients at the top of the figure indicate that the
party’s electoral success depends on the number of its members but not on its representativeness.
Indeed, the votes received and the number of party members are highly correlated (98%), whereas
the correlation between the votes received and the party’s representativeness is negative (−37%),
although statistically little significant. The regression line fitted to the representativeness curve
confirms the same: the less successful parties tend to be more representative than the winning
parties, although this dependence is rather irregular (R2 = 0.12) and statistically little significant
(PF = 0.0774).
[Friendly 2002, p. 318] notes that ‘the task of detecting patterns of relations, trends, and
anomalies is made considerably easier when “similar” variables are arranged contiguously’ —
in our case, when neighboring parties have close policy profiles. The given party ordering is
characterized by Figure 2, displaying the triangle of correlations between the party profiles. It is
colored as a geographical map with brown mountains, green valleys and blue ocean depth (‘relief
table’ [Tangian 2011, p. 107 ff.]). It plainly appears that close profiles of neighboring parties
would imply a brown ridge of correlation peaks along the diagonal, which is not observed here.
Therefore, our goal is to find a new party ordering with highly correlated profiles of neighboring
parties. This ordering will also characterize the German actual political spectrum.
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Table 1: German parties in the 2013 Bundestag election
Party logo Party description Number of
members
Votes received
Number %
Union of Germany’s two main conservative parties, Christlich
Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic
Union of Germany) founded in 1950 and Christlich-Soziale Union
in Bayern (Christian Social Union of Bavaria) founded in 1945
635000 18157256 41.550
Sozial-demokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic
Party) founded in 1863
477000 11247283 25.737
Die LINKE (The Left) founded in 2007 as the merger of East
German communists and the Electoral Alternative for Labour
and Social Justice (WASG), a left-wing breakaway from the SPD
64000 3752577 8.587
BU¨NDNIS 90/DIE GRU¨NEN (Alliance 90/The Greens) founded
in 1993 as the merger of DIE GRU¨NEN (West Germany) and
BU¨NDNIS 90 (East Germany), both with a social-democratic
background
60800 3690314 8.445
Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party) founded in
1948, liberal political party close to employers’ organizations
60000 2082305 4.765
Alternative fu¨r Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) founded
in 2013, a conservative, euro-currency-sceptic party
14000 2052372 4.696
Piratenpartei Deutschland (Pirate Party of Germany) founded
in 2006, a part of international Pirate movement promoting the
information society with a free access to all digital medias
31700 958507 2.193
National-demokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Demo-
cratic Party of Germany) founded in 1964, a far-right German
nationalist party
5000 560660 1.283
FREIE WA¨HLER (Free Voters) founded in 2009, a party of op-
position to the EU financial policy
6000 422857 0.968
Mensch Umwelt Tierschutz (Human Environment Animal Wel-
fare) founded in 1993, a party promoting the introduction of
animal rights into the German constitution
1000 140251 0.321
O¨kologisch-Demokratische Partei (Ecological Democratic Party)
founded in 1982, an conservative environmentalist party
5700 127085 0.291
Die Republikaner (The Republicans) founded in 1983, a national
conservative party opposiing to immigration
5800 91660 0.210
Partei fu¨r Arbeit, Rechtstaat, Tierschutz, Elitefo¨rderung und ba-
sisdemokratische Initiative (Party for Work, Rule-of-Law, Pro-
tection of Animals, Advancement of Elites, and Grassroot-
Democratic Initiative) founded in 2004, a populist parodical
party with totalitarian trends
10000 78357 0.179
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Table 1: German parties in the 2013 Bundestag election (continued)
Party logo Party description Number of
members
Votes received
Number %
Bu¨rger-bewegung pro Deutschland (Pro Germany Citizens’
Movement) founded in 2005, a far-right populist party oppos-
ing to illegal immigration and multi-national corporations and
financial institutions
730 74311 0.170
Bayernpartei (Bavaria Party) founded in 1946, a separatist
Bavarian party advocating Bavarian independence within the Eu-
ropean Union
500 57285 0.131
Volks-abstimmung (Referendum party) founded in 1997, a party
promoting direct democracy of Swiss type
1000 28667 0.066
Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (Marxist-Leninist
Party of Germany) founded in 1982, an anti-revisionist party,
referring to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Zedong
2300 25336 0.058
RENTNER Partei Deutschland (German Party of Pensioneers)
founded in 2002, a party of social welfare state bridging interests
of generations
750 25190 0.058
Partei der Vernunft (Party of Reason) founded in 2009, a lib-
eral party promoting the ideas of Austrian School of economics
- minimal state, free market, decentralization of political power
and subsidiarity
1000 25027 0.057
Partei Bibeltreuer Christen (Party of Bible-abiding Christians)
founded in 1989, a conservative evangelical party, opposing anti-
semetism, same-sex marriage and abortion
2700 18529 0.042
Bu¨ndnis fu¨r Innovation und Gerechtigkeit (Alliance for Innova-
tion and Justice) founded in 2010, a party of muslims promoting
their integration
1000 17965 0.041
Bu¨rgerrechts-bewegung Solidarita¨t (Civil Rights Movement Soli-
darity) founded in 1992, a part of the worldwide LaRouche (U.S.
politician) Youth movement with republican orientation but pro-
moting worlwide solidarity, e.g. abolishing debts of the Third
World
1200 13131 0.030
DIE FRAUEN (The Women) a feminist party founded in 1995
promoting rights of women
300 12522 0.029
Partei der Nichtwa¨hler (Party of Non-Voters) founded in 1998,
a party with a social democratic background promoting improv-
ing representative democracy by introducing elements of direct
democracy
400 11349 0.026
Bu¨ndnis 21 / Rentnerinnen- und Rentner-Partei (Alliance 21 /
Female and Male Pensioneer Party) founded in 2007, promoting
improving the pension, health and education systems
1050 8851 0.020
Die Violetten — fu¨r spirituelle Politik (The Violet — for spir-
itual Policy) founded in 2001 claiming to represent ‘alternative
spiritual politics in the new age’
700 8248 0.019
Familien-Partei Deutschlands (The Family Party of Germany)
founded in 1983, a party promoting family values
600 7451 0.017
Partei fu¨r Soziale Gleichheit, Sektion der Vierten Internationale
(Party of Social Justice, Section of the Fourth International)
founded in 1997, a Trotskist party
300 4840 0.011
13
Table 2: Public opinion and party positions on topical policy questions
Questions Question weights Public
opinion
Un-
weight-
ed
Google
hits
in K
1st
expert
Unger
2nd
expert
Graef
Pro-
tago-
nists
An-
tago-
nists
log
2
0–3 0–3 % %
1 Introduce a nationwide minimum wage 1 10.98 3 3 86 12
2 Parents of children who do not attend state-sponsored day care
should receive a childcare subsidy
1 9.98 2 3 20 77
3 Introduce a general speed limit on highways 1 8.70 2 1 53 45
4 Germany should retain the Euro as its currency 1 9.28 2 3 69 27
5 Electricity prices should be more heavily regulated by the state 1 9.40 2 3 90 10
6 Video surveillance in public spaces should be expanded 1 6.58 3 2 81 18
7 Germany should introduce an unconditional basic income 1 9.48 3 1 80 20
8 Only organic agriculture should receive financial incentives 1 9.10 1 0 76 23
9 All children, regardless of cultural heritage, should receive equal
education
1 5.42 1 3 33 60
10 The top income tax rate should be increased 1 8.27 2 3 75 22
11 Germany should leave NATO 1 6.98 1 2 52 36
12 No new construction of coal-fired energy plants 1 7.48 1 2 92 8
13 The ‘morning after’ pill must be available on prescription only 1 6.45 2 0 68 32
14 All banks in Germany should be nationalized 1 7.34 2 2 60 31
15 Germany should accept more refugees 1 8.75 3 2 39 56
16 Employees should be compensated by the state for the time spent
for incapacitated relatives
1 6.58 3 2 ? ?
17 Political parties that are unconstitutional should remain illegal 1 5.54 2 2 73 22
18 The level of federal student financial aid should be independent of
the parents’ income
1 11.01 1 2 51 21
19 Border control should be re-introduced 1 8.63 1 1 48 52
20 A legal female quota should be introduced for companies’ board
members
1 10.25 2 3 31 65
21 Financially stronger federal states should less support weaker ones 1 8.17 2 2 9 86
22 The legally mandated retirement age should be lowered again 1 11.77 3 3 73 17
23 The government should employ more people with immigrant back-
ground
1 7.77 2 1 ? ?
24 Exports of munitions should be forbidden 1 7.71 3 1 78 20
25 Retain the tax law that favors spouses 1 8.39 2 1 81 16
26 Germany should champion Turkey’s bid for EU membership 1 8.79 1 1 27 68
27 Bundestag members should reveal their exact auxiliary income 1 5.95 1 1 76 20
28 Energy-intensive industries should bear more of the costs of the
transition to renewable energy
1 8.87 1 3 81 15
29 Recipients of long-term unemployment benefits should receive less
if they turn down a job offer
1 7.65 2 3 50 50
30 The state should continue to collect tithes on behalf of religious
institutions
1 9.81 0 0 31 69
31 All citizens should be required to enroll in the public health insur-
ance system
1 14.95 3 3 83 16
32 Every state in the Euro zone should be liable to pay its own debts 1 10.50 1 3 52 38
33 Homosexual couples should be allowed to adopt 1 5.75 1 1 63 30
34 Abolish the collection of communication data (e.g. telephone, in-
ternet) without probable cause
1 9.61 3 2 65 30
35 By new lettings, the rental price increase should be limited 1 6.75 2 3 73 25
36 German citizens should be allowed to have additional nationalities 1 7.29 1 3 42 53
37 Institute a passenger-car toll on the national highways 1 9.95 1 1 22 57
38 Introduce referenda at the federal level 1 8.91 1 1 87 11
Representativeness index, %
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Table 2: Public opinion and party positions on topical policy questions (continued)
Questions Party
positions
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1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 ? 1 1 1 1
2 1 0 0 0 ? 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 ? 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
3 0 0 1 1 0 0 ? 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 ? 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 ? 0 1 1 1
4 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 ? 1 0 1 1 0 ? 1 1 1 1 0
5 0 1 1 ? 0 0 ? 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 ? 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 1 ? 0 0 0 0 0 ? 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 ? ? 1 0 1 0
7 0 0 ? ? 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 1 0 ? ? 0 1 0 1
8 0 ? ? ? 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ? 1 1 1 0
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 ? 1 1 0 ? 1 1 1 ? 1 1 1 1
10 0 1 1 1 0 0 ? 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 ? 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
11 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 ? 0 1 0 ? 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 ? 0 1
12 0 0 1 1 0 ? 1 1 0 1 1 0 ? 0 1 ? 1 0 0 ? 1 0 1 ? 1 1 1 ?
13 1 0 0 0 ? 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 ? 1 1 1 0
14 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
15 0 1 1 1 ? 0 1 0 0 ? 1 0 1 0 0 ? 1 ? 0 ? 1 1 1 ? ? 1 1 1
16 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 ? 1 1 1 1
17 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 ? 1 0 1 1 1 ? 1 1 1 1 0
18 0 ? 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 ? 0 1 1 1
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 ? 0
20 ? 1 1 1 0 0 ? 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 ? ? 1 ? 0 1 1 0
21 ? 0 0 0 0 1 ? ? ? 0 ? 1 0 ? 1 ? 0 0 1 ? 0 0 0 ? 0 0 1 0
22 0 1 1 0 ? 0 ? 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 ? ? 1 1 ? 1
23 1 1 1 1 1 ? 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 ? 1 ? 0 0 1 1 1 ? ? 1 1 1
24 0 0 1 ? 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 ? 1 1 ? ? 1 0 0 ? 0 ? 1 1 0 1 1 1
25 1 ? 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 ? 1 0 ? 0
26 0 1 1 1 ? 0 ? 0 0 0 ? 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 ? ? ? 1 0 0
27 ? 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
28 0 ? 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
29 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 ? 1 ? 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 ? 1 0 0 0
30 1 1 0 ? ? 1 0 ? 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 ? 0 0 0 1 1 ? 0 ? 0 0 0 0
31 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 ? 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 ? 1 0 1 1
32 1 ? 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 ? 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 ? 1 1 1 0
33 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 ? 1 ? 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 ? 1
34 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
35 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 ? 1 1 1 1
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Figure 1: Party sizes, votes received, and representativeness of German parties in 2013
3 Principal Component Analysis Solution
Following [Friendly 2002, Friendly and Kwan 2003], we find a contiguous party ordering by
means of Principal Component Analysis of the correlation matrix (the correlation triangle in
Figure 2 is its bottom-left half). The upper plot in Figure 3 shows the location of the party
vectors in the two-dimensional space of the first two components that cover 83.4% of the total
variance. The correlation between the party profiles is approximated by the cosine of the angle
between the party vectors. Thereby we obtain a circular ordering, with neighboring parties
having correlated policy profiles. Cutting this circular ordering at the greatest angle (between
the vectors of the far-left Trotskist party PSG — and far-right nationalist party NDP) and going
clockwise, we obtain a plausible left-right party ordering.
The correlation triangle with the new party ordering is shown in Figure 4. It has the desired
ridge of brown correlation peaks of neighboring parties along the diagonal, green low correlation
‘valleys’ of more distant parties, then a blue negatively correlated band of the parties opposite
in the circular ordering, and, finally, the green bottom-left vertex, indicating that the far-left
and far-right parties have something in common.
The figure S = −3592 beyond the correlation triangle, the total weighted squared distance
of the cells to the diagonal, characterizes the ordering contiguity. For each cell, its distance to
the diagonal is the minimal number of cells to the diagonal, that is, the distance of the (i, j)-
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Figure 2: Triangle of party profile correlations (in %), for the parties ordered by votes received
cell, i > j, to the diagonal is i − j − 1 (we refer to the so-called Manhattan distance). The
squared distances are weighted with the corresponding correlation coefficients ρij , so that the
total weighted distance of cells to the diagonal is
S =
∑
i>j
ρij × 100% × (i− j − 1)
2 .
The much better contiguity of the party ordering in Figure 4 is reflected by S = −3592, compared
with S = 9857 in Figure 2.
The two plots below the correlation triangle in Figure 4 depict the representativeness curve
for two versions of the party scale. In the first plot, the distances between the parties’ ticks are
made proportional to the angle between the party vectors in Figure 3, i.e. the closer the ticks,
the closer the party profiles. The party scale in the bottom plot is uniform, that is, the closeness
of the party profiles is not taken into account. In both plots of Figure 4, the representativeness
curve exhibits visible trends. Indeed, the regression lines fitted to the representativeness curve
have much superior fitting parameters R2 and PF than in Figure 2. The statistically significant
descent of the regression line in both plots (PF < 0.01) indicates at a higher representativeness
of left parties and lower representativeness of right parties.
To reveal a trend for the circular party ordering, we consider a special circular regression
model with the same fitting parameters as for the linear regression used so far (to make both
models comparable). For this purpose, we locate the vectors of the independent variable (party
17
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Figure 3: Principal component analysis solution. (1) Eigenvector plot for the correlation matrix
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Figure 4: Principal component analysis solution. (1) Triangle of party profile correlations (in %),
for the party ordering found. (2) The representativeness curve of the parties and its regression for
this party ordering with taking into account the distance between neighboring parties (visualized
by vertical grid lines with variable distances). (3) The representativeness curve of the parties
and its regression for this party ordering without taking into account the distance between
neighboring parties (visualized by vertical grid lines with equal distances).
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vectors) on a circumference in a two-dimensional XY -plane, and the dependent variable (party
representativeness index) locate in the third Z-dimension exactly above the party vectors; see
the bottom plot in Figure 3. Then we fit a regression plane to the resulting three dimensional
vectors in the XY Z-space, and obtain the predicted values at the intersection of the regression
plane with the cylinder over the given circumference. This intersection curve transferred to
the plots of Figure 4 is the regression sinusoid. The quality of fit of the regression sinusoid is
even better than that of the regression line, reflecting the circular nature of the party ordering.
This regression model introduces some corrections to our previous statement about the superior
representativeness of left parties. It looks that the most representative are the moderate left
parties, then come far-left and far-right parties, and the least representative are centrist and
moderate conservative parties.
4 Traveling Salesman Problem Solution
The PCA method performs dimensionality reduction: a 38-dimensional space with 28 policy
profile vectors of 28 parties is quite accurately approximated with a two-dimensional space,
covering over 83% of the total variance. This model reveals that the German political spectrum
can be approximately regarded as the left-right ideological axis rolled in a circumference. Let
us see, which contiguous circular axis can be obtained directly, not dealing with dimensionality
reduction.
For this purpose we reformulate our task as a traveling salesman problem. We have to find
the shortest cyclic itinerary through 28 destinations, that are in our case 28 parties, visiting
each only once. As the distance table, we use our correlation triangle somewhat modified. The
distances between parties with highly correlated profiles should be close to 0, and between parties
with negatively correlated profiles relatively large. Therefore, we derive the distance dij between
parties i, j from the correlation coefficient ρij with the opposite sign as follows
dij = 1− ρij .
The upper plot in Figure 5 shows the shortest circular itinerary through the 28 parties.
This way we obtain both linear and circular ordering of contiguous parties. The longest arc is
removed to show the shortest itinerary through the 28 parties without returning to the starting
point. The lower plot in Figure 5 illustrates the construction of the regression sinusoid for the
new circular ordering, which follows the same principles as described in the previous section.
Figure 6 visualizes the properties of the new linear and cyclic party orderings. The quality of
fit of regression lines and sinusoids to the representativeness curve in both bottom plots is supe-
rior to that in Figure 4, because the party ordering is optimized with respect to contiguity only,
being no longer subordinated to dimensionality reduction. However, this has its drawbacks: the
correlation triangle is not that structurally layered as in Figure 4, and the overall concentration
of correlation peaks along the diagonal is weaker, having S = 865 compared with S = −3592 in
Figure 4.
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Figure 5: Traveling salesman problem solution. (1) The parties are ordered to minimize the
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Figure 6: Traveling salesman problem method. (1) Triangle of party profile correlations (in %),
for the party ordering found. (2) The representativeness curve of the parties and its regression for
this party ordering with taking into account the distance between neighboring parties (visualized
by vertical grid lines with variable distances). (3) The representativeness curve of the parties
and its regression for this party ordering without taking into account the distance between
neighboring parties (visualized by vertical grid lines with equal distances).
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5 Weighted least squares solution
Now we optimize the party ordering with regard to the concentration of correlation peaks along
the diagonal of the correlation triangle. For this purpose we minimize the weighted squared dis-
tance of cells of the correlation triangle to its diagonal, i.e., we minimize the following expression
with which we characterize the correlation triangle
S =
∑
i>j
ρij(i− j − 1)
2
→ min
The optimization is made iteratively as long as no further progress is attained. At each step, a
loop on 28 parties is performed. In each loop, the current party is relocated in the ordering to
minimize the sum S (this is also implemented as a loop on 28 alternative positions).
The new party ordering and its properties are visualized in Figure 7. As one can see,
S = −5376 is the least compared with that in Figures 2, 4 and 6. However, the quality of fit
of regression lines and sinusoids is inferior to that in Figures 4 and 6 (the distances between
the parties in the middle plot of Figure 6 are defined as in Section ‘Traveling salesman problem
solution’). This can be interpreted that the German political spectrum cannot be approximated
by a single linear axis with missing circularity (which requires a two-dimensional room).
6 Weighted largest squares solution
The task we formulate now is similar to that from the previous section, but we change the
criterion of optimization. Instead of minimizing the total distance of correlation peaks to the
correlation triangle diagonal, we maximize the distance of correlation peaks from the bottom-left
vertex of the correlation triangle. In other words, we perform the same procedure as previously
but with maximizing the following expression (recall that if n is the number of parties then n−1
is the distance of the bottom-left vertex of the correlation triangle to its diagonal):
Smax =
∑
i>j
ρij[n − 1− (i− j)]
2 =
∑
i>j
ρij(27 − i+ j)
2
→ max
The new party ordering and its properties are visualized in Figure 8. As one can see, S = −4409
is not as small as in Figure 7, but smaller than in Figures 2, 4 and 6. The quality of fit of
regression lines is a little worse than in Figure 7 but the regression sinusoids are fitted better to
the representativeness curve. The bottom-left corner of the correlation triangle is not as filled
with dark blue cells with most negative correlation coefficients as in Figure 7, meaning that a
certain circularity in the party ordering is somehow revealed (the vertex cell binding the far-
left and far-right ends is green!). Therefore, the sinusoids in the two bottom plots of Figure 8
are fitted to the representativeness curve better than in Figure 7. The ‘revival’ of circularity
in the party ordering makes it quite similar to the ordering in Figure 4 obtained by means of
dimensionality reduction.
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Figure 7: Weighted least squares method. (1) Triangle of party profile correlations (in %), for
the party ordering found. (2) The representativeness curve of the parties and its regression for
this party ordering with taking into account the distance between neighboring parties (visualized
by vertical grid lines with variable distances). (3) The representativeness curve of the parties
and its regression for this party ordering without taking into account the distance between
neighboring parties (visualized by vertical grid lines with equal distances).
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Figure 8: Weighted largest squares method. (1) Triangle of party profile correlations (in %), for
the party ordering found. (2) The representativeness curve of the parties and its regression for
this party ordering with taking into account the distance between neighboring parties (visualized
by vertical grid lines with variable distances). (3) The representativeness curve of the parties
and its regression for this party ordering without taking into account the distance between
neighboring parties (visualized by vertical grid lines with equal distances).
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Figure 9: Torus (a bagel-like body) whose form illustrates the spatial location of party policy
vectors along the circular axis with minor deviations
7 Conclusions
The ‘objective’ ordering of 28 German parties, obtained purely formally without any normative
assumption, brings us to the known left–right ideological axis rolled in a circumference, making
the extreme left-hand and right-hand ends meet. In the policy space, party profile vectors may
have minor deviations from this rolled axis, making a bagel-shaped ‘cloud of observations’ (this
type of body is known in geometry as torus). Due to the deviations, the circular axis gets volume,
turning into a circular tube, as shown in Figure 9 for one-dimensional deviations. When the
deviations are multi-dimensional, as in our study, the principle remains the same but the tube
should be imagined in a multi-dimensional space.
The most plausible and accurate left–right axis is obtained by dimensionality reduction of
the policy space with the Principal Component Analysis, as compared with three other methods
considered. The consequent party ordering exhibits a statistically highly significant dependence
between the party’s ideological platform and its representativeness, with the left parties being
more representative than the right ones. The even more accurate circular representation of the
German political spectrum demonstrates that the extreme left parties tend to be less represen-
tative than moderate left parties, and the far-right parties tend to be more representative than
moderate right (conservative) parties.
Basing on this empirical evidence, we conclude that the left-right characterization of parties
which reflects the class opposition remains valid, being in no case outdated. Our study also
indicates at the raising far-right wing, whose representativeness already surpasses that of the
conservative party that has won the 2013 election. As for the moderate left parties, it looks
that their superior representativeness can help to restore their influence, which sharply declined
after the collapse of communism in the end of the 20th century.
26
8 References
Blattberg Ch (2009) Political philosophies and political ideologies. In: Blattberg Ch. Patriotic
Elaborations: Essays in Practical Philosophy. McGill–Queen’s University Press, Montreal
Bobbio N, Cameron A (1996) Left and right: the significance of a political distinction. Chicago,
University of Chicago Press
Budge I, Klingemann HD, Volkens A, Bara J, Tanenbaum E (2001) Mapping policy pref-
erences: estimates for parties, electors and governments 1945–1998. Oxford University
Press, Oxford
Budge I, McDonald MD (2007) Election and party system effects on policy representation:
bringing time into a comparative perspective. Electoral Studies, 26(1), 168–179
Bundeswahlleiter (2013) Ergebnisse der Wahl zum 18. Deutschen Bundestag. http://www.
bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/BTWBUND09/
Bundeszentrale fu¨r politische Bildung (2013). Wahl-O-Mat. http://www.bpb.de/politik/
wahlen/wahl-o-mat/
Downs A (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper and Row, NY
EU profiler (2009). http://www.euprofiler.eu/
Friendly M (2002) Corrgrams: exploratory displays for correlation matrices. American statis-
tician, 56(4), 316–324. http://www.datavis.ca/papers/corrgram.pdf
Friendly M, Kwan E (2003) Effect ordering for data display. Computational Statistics and
Data Analysis, 43, 509–539. http://www.datavis.ca/papers/effect/effect.pdf
Garzia D, Marschall S (eds) (2014) Matching Voters with Parties and Candidates: Voting
Advice Applications in a Comparative Perspective. ECPR Press, Colchester
Gauchet M (1996) Right and left. In: Nora P, Kritzman LD (Eds.) Realms of Memory:
Rethinking the French Past. Vol 1 Conflicts and Divisions. Columbia University Press,
New York, 240–298
Giddens A (1994) Beyond Left and Right, the Future of Radical Politics. Stanford University
Press, Stanford CA
Gill J, Hangartner D (2010) Circular data in political science and how to handle it. Political
Analysis, 18(3), 316–336. http://artsci.wustl.edu/~jgill/papers/mpq009.pdf
Kieskompas (2006). http://www.kieskompas.nl/
Klingemann HD, Volkens A, Bara JL, Budge J, McDonald MD (eds) (2006) Mapping Pol-
icy Preferences II. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe,
European Union, and OECD 1990–2003. Oxford University Press, Oxford
27
Knapp A, Wright V (2001) The Government and Politics of France. Routledge, New York
Left–right politics (2015) Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left%E2%80%93right_
politics
Lijphart A (1999) Patterns of Democracy. Yale University Press, New Heaven–London
Linhart E, ShikanoS (2007) Die Generierung von Parteipositionen aus vorverschluesselten
Wahlprogrammen fu¨r die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, MZES working paper. Mannheim,
Mannheimer Zentrum fu¨r Europa¨ische Sozialforschung
Lipset SM (1960) Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Doubleday, Garden City NY
Mahoney J, Coogle CL, Banks PD (1984) Values in presidential inaugural addresses: A test of
Rokeach’s two-factor theory of political ideology. Psychological Reports, 55 (3), 683–686
Manin B (1997) The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge
Marks G, Hooghe L, Nelson M, Edwards E (2006) Party competition and European integration
in the East and the West. Different structure, same causality. Comparative Political
Studies 39, 155–175.
Marx K (1867) Das Kapital. Band I. Verlag von Otto Meisner, Hamburg. http://www.
mlwerke.de/me/me23/me23_000.htm
Matthews GVT (1974) On bird navigation, with some statistical undertones. J Royal Stat Soc
B, 36, 349–64
Mitchell BP (2007) Eight Ways to Run the Country: A New and Revealing Look at Left and
Right. Praeger, Westport CN
Political spectrum (2015) Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_spectrum
Pro demos: Hois voor democratie en rechtsstaat (2015) StemWijzer. http://www.stemwijzer.
nl/
Rabinowitz G, MacDonald SE (1989) A directional theory of issue voting. Am Pol Sc Rev
83(1), 93–121
Rous GL, Lee DE (1978) Freedom and equality: two values of political orientation. J Commu-
nication, 28, 45–51
Ruypers J (2005) Canadian and World Politics. Emond Montgomery Publications Limited,
Toronto
Schofield NJ (1985) Social Choice and Democracy. Springer, New York
28
Schofield NJ (1993) Party competition in a spatial model of coalition formation. In: Barnett
WA, Hinich MJ, Schofield NJ (eds) Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and
Representation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 135–174
Smithies A (1941) Optimum location in spatial competition. J Polit Econ, 49, 423–39
Streeck W (1999) Competitive Solidarity: Rethinking the ’European Social Model’. MPIfG
Working Paper 99/8, September 1999. Reprinted in: Leibfried S, Mau S (2008) (eds) Wel-
fare States: Construction, Deconstruction, Reconstruction. Vol II: Varieties and Transfor-
mations. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 549–565
Sulakshin S (2010) A quantitative political spectrum and forecasting of social evolution. Int J
Interdisciplinary Soc Sc, 5(4), 55–66
Tangian A (2011) Flexicurity and Political Philosophy. Nova, New York
Tangian A (2013) 2013 Election to German Bundestag from the Viewpoint of Direct Democ-
racy. WSI-Diskussionspapier 186. Hans-Bo¨ckler-Foundation, Du¨sseldorf. http://www.
boeckler.de/pdf/p_wsi_disp_186.pdf
Tangian A (2014) Mathematical Theory of Democracy. Springer, Berlin–Heidelberg
Voda P (2014) Class voting in West and East. Paper at the 8th ECPR General Conference,
University of Glasgow, September 3–6, 2014. http://ecpr.eu/events/paperlist.aspx?
EventID=4&SectionID=28&PanelID=288
Volkens A, Bara J, Budge I, McDonald MD, Klingemann HD (eds) (2013) Mapping Policy
Preferences from Texts: Statistical Solutions for Manifesto Analysts. Oxford University
Press, Oxford
Vote Match Europe (2015). http://www.votematch.eu/
Ware A (1996) Political Parties and Party Systems. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Weber M (1921) Economy and Society, ed Roth G and Wittich C, 2 vols. University of
California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978. http://s0ftpedia.net/files/max%
20weber%20economy%20and%20society%20pdf&id=my
Wilson MS (2004) Values and political ideology: Rokeach’s two-value model in a proportional
representation environment. New Zealand J Psychology, 33(3), 155–162
WZB (2015) The Manifesto Project. WZB, Berlin. https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/
information/information
29
No. 66 
No. 65
No. 64
No. 63
No. 62 
No. 61
No. 60
No. 59
No. 58
No. 57
No. 56 
Andranik Tangian: Decision making in politics and economics: 6. Empiri-
cally constructing the German political spectrum, April 2015
Daniel Hoang and Martin Ruckes: The effects of disclosure policy on risk 
management incentives and market entry, November 2014
Sebastian Gatzer, Daniel Hoang, Martin Ruckes: Internal capital markets 
and diversified firms: Theory and practice, November 2014
Andrea Hammer: Innovation of knowledge intensive service firms in ur-
ban areas, October 2014
Markus Höchstötter and Mher Safarian: Stochastic technical analysis for 
decision making on the financial market, October 2014
Kay Mitusch, Gernot Liedtke, Laurent Guihery, David Bälz: The structure 
of freight flows in Europe and its implications for EU railway freight
policy, September 2014
Christian Feige, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Jan Krämer: Voting on contributions 
to a threshold public goods game - an experimental investigation, 
August 2014
Tim Deeken and Ingrid Ott: Integration as a spatial institution: Implica-
tions for agglomeration and growth, July 2014
Mher Safarian: Erhaltungsgesetze für das Modell Mr |Gr |1 | ∞ in der Klas-
se der konservativen Abfertigungsdisziplinen, July 2014
Marten Hillebrand: Existence of bubbly equilibria in overlapping genera-
tions models with stochastic production, June 2014
Mher Safarian: Hedging options including transaction costs in incomplete 
markets, April 2014
recent issues
Working Paper Series in Economics
The responsibility for the contents of the working papers rests with the author, not the Institute. Since working papers 
are of a preliminary nature, it may be useful to contact the author of a particular working paper about results or ca-
veats before referring to, or quoting, a paper. Any comments on working papers should be sent directly to the author.
